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LEXICAL REPRESENTATION AND MODIFICATION
WITHIN THE NOUN PHRASE
ABSTRACT
Formal semanticists of natural language have traditionally worked with
relatively impoverished lexical representations and have generally been
conservative in drawing the line between those aspects of interpretation which
are determined by lexical information and composition rules, and those which
are determined contextually, leaving a substantial amount of work to context.
While this strategy is justifiable if one considers the job of the semanticist to
account only for what is strictly entailed, it has also in some sense greatly
simplified this job, resulting in rather impoverished lexical representations
and relegating many problems to the so-called pragmatics wastebasket, if in a
relatively orderly fashion.
Nonetheless, in this paper I discuss two kinds of problems, both related to
modification within the noun phrase, which show why richer lexical
representations similar to those proposed in Generative Lexicon theory
(Pustejovsky 1995) should be of interest to formal semanticists.
KEYWORDS
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1. Introduction 1
Formal semanticists of natural language have traditionally worked
with relatively impoverished lexical representations. They have arguably
done so for two reasons. First, at least initially, the predominant concern of
most formal semanticists was to account for the compositional behavior of
words and phrases at a relatively general level, rather than for fine-grained
details of interpretation. This resulted in an emphasis on the argument
structure of lexical items and, with few exceptions, the treatment of lexical
information only insofar as it interacted with phenomena like coordination,
quantification, or Aktionsart. Second, formal semanticists have generally
been very conservative in drawing the line between those aspects of
interpretation which are determined by lexical information and composition
rules, and those which are determined contextually, leaving a substantial
amount of work to context. Contextually-determined aspects of interpretation
have been handled uniformly via variables whose value is supplied by one of
any number of variable assignment functions. While this strategy is justifiable
if one considers the job of the semanticist to account only for what is strictly
entailed, it has also in some sense greatly simplified this job, resulting in
rather impoverished lexical representations and relegating many problems to
the so-called pragmatics wastebasket, if in a relatively orderly fashion.
While leaving much of the interpretive work to contextual variables
may be principled, taken to an extreme, it is not clear how tenable a strategy
it is in the long run. First, trying to maintain a sharp distinction between the
lexicon and world knowledge is probably naïve, and at some point some
workable strategies for dealing with this fuzzy boundary have to be
developed. Second, the ways in which context is exploited to enrich
interpretation are varied, but they are not random. Semantic theory might be
expected to have something to say about at least some aspects of contextual
interpretation that are predictable. Third, natural language processing
applications have already reached a degree of sophistication where they will
soon be expected (if they aren’t already expected) to provide richer
information than what current formal semantics has to offer, or else semantics
as a discipline will be in danger of becoming irrelevant, unable to account for
all kinds of very real interpretive phenomena.
Perhaps for this latter reason, more work has been done on the formal
treatment of the lexicon by computational linguists and lexicographers than
by theoretical semanticists. Among this work, perhaps the most familiar to
linguists is Pustejovksy’s Generative Lexicon theory (hereafter, GL). GL has
been criticized, most notably by Fodor and Lepore (1998), for including too
much pragmatics in the lexicon, a criticism to which I have been sympathetic
myself and which I have heard repeated by a number of semanticists.
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Nonetheless, in this paper I discuss two kinds of problems, both related to
modification within the noun phrase (NP), which show why richer lexical
representations similar to those proposed by Pustejovsky should be of interest
to formal semanticists. As I can only begin to sketch possible solutions to
these problems at this point, my main goal is a modest one : to convince the
skeptic that highly structured lexical representations are worth exploring.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 I review a class of
modification phenomena which have been dealt with in some of the literature
by expanding the argument list associated with nouns, and I argue that, given
the choice between such an expansion or the use of highly structured
representations, the latter are to be preferred. In section 3, I discuss how the
scalar interpretation of adjectives is sensitive to the semantics of the nouns
they modify, in ways that are difficult to account for via meaning postulates,
for example, and which also argue for enriched representations. Section 4
presents some concluding comments.
2. Expanded argument lists vs structured representations
Adjectives such as those in (1) have are called SUBSECTIVE, as opposed
to INTERSECTIVE because they license the inference that anything that is an
[Adjective Noun] is a [Noun], but not that it is [Adjective]. For instance, (1a)
can be understood subsectively as entailing that Olga is a dancer but not
physically beautiful (alternatively, beautiful, can be interpreted intersectively,
entailing that Olga is in fact beautiful) ; similarly, (1b) licenses the inference
that Laia is a smoker, but not that she is occasional :
(1) a. Olga is a beautiful dancer.
b. Laia is an occasional smoker.
Larson (1998) presents a series of very strong arguments against the early
formal semantic analysis of adjectives such as those in (1a) and (1b), on
which the adjective is ambiguous : of type <<e,t>,<e,t>>, on the “beautiful-
as-a-dancer” reading, and of type <e,t> on the “beautiful as a person” reading
(see e.g. Siegel 1976). He argues instead for treating such adjectives
uniformly as type <e,t>, and also proposes systematically supplying nouns
with an event argument that can be modified directly by the adjective, just as
its entity argument standardly is. The two interpretations of (1a) thus correlate
with whether the adjective modifies the noun’s event or entity argument : (1a)
would be translated as in (2a) on the reading that Olga dances beautifully, and
as in (2b) on the reading that she is e.g. physically beautiful :
(2) a. ∃e[dancer (o, e) & beautiful(e)]
b. ∃e[dancer (o, e) & beautiful(o)]
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The adjective beautiful is thus underspecified as to whether it modifies an
entity or an event. Occasional, on the other hand, is restricted to modifying
events. Thus, (1b) would be translated only as (3) :
(3) ∃e[smoker(l, e) & occasional(e)]
McNally & Boleda (2004) extend Larson’s arguments to so-called relational
adjectives like that in (4), a class of subsectives not explicitly discussed by
Larson.
(4) Toni is a computational linguist.
They argue that a directly analogous account can be given for relational
adjectives if we simply assume that nouns have a kind argument along the
lines suggested in Krifka et al. (1995), with relational adjectives denoting
properties of kinds rather than properties of ordinary individuals 2.
(5) linguist(t, ki) & computational(ki)
Larson’s proposal relies on a straightforward extension to nouns of
Davidson’s (1967) proposal that verbs have an event argument 3. McNally &
Boleda’s analysis is not intended to conflict with this proposal, but rather to
supplement it. Thus, if both proposals are accepted (for example, to be able to
account for noun phrases such as that in (6a)), the argument structure of nouns
starts to look rather complex : the translation of (6a) would be as in (6b) :
(6) a. Toni is an occasional computational linguist.
b. ∃e[linguist(t,e,ki) & occasional(e) & computational(ki)]
While there is nothing technically wrong with such a long list of arguments,
the longer it gets, the less attractive it looks, as it fails to distinguish between
those arguments which have demonstrable syntactic manifestations (arguably
the case for the event argument) and those that do not (such as, most likely,
the kind argument, and others to be discussed momentarily). And just how
long could such a list get ?
The answer is : rather long, if we include under this general type of
analysis other cases of adjectival modification which have similar properties.
In particular, although (1a) is arguably ambiguous rather than vague, and (1b)
and (4) are neither vague nor ambiguous, Pustejovsky (1995) offered an
analysis fundamentally similar to Larson’s to account for relatively fine-
grained vagueness resolution involving adjective interpretation in examples
such as the following :
(7) a. a red pen (writes in red or has a red exterior)
b. a quick meal (quickly prepared or quickly eaten)
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The essence of Pustejovsky’s analysis involved allowing the adjective to
intersectively modify any one of several event arguments associated with the
interpretation of the noun. For example, meal would have in its semantic
representation an event variable corresponding to the typical act by which the
meal is created (the value of the so-calledAGENTIVE qualia feature), as well
as one corresponding to the typical purpose that the meal has, i.e. an eating
event (the value of the TELIC qualia feature) 4. If we chose to represent such
variables as we have represented the event and kind arguments in e.g. (6b),
we might end up with a representation for a noun like implementation such as
in (8).
(8) λkλxλeAGλeTELλe. implementation (x,e,eAG,eTEL,k)
But once the argument list for the noun starts gets this long, an alternative,
more highly structured representation such as that proposed by Pustejovsky
(1995) starts to look more appealing, as it easily permits distinguishing those
variables which have syntactic consequences from those which do not, or
those which license discourse referents from those which generally do not. A
GL counterpart for (8) might be as in (9). The argument structure (ARGSTR)
of the noun is represented independently of the semantics, though the two are
linked. The semantics, encoded in what is termed QUALIA STRUCTURE, contains
information about the basic type of entity denoted by the noun (the value of
the FORMAL quale – here the implementation-kind or, alternatively, an
instance of that kind) ; its composition (the CONSTITUTIVE quale) 5 ; in the
case of a noun denoting an artifact, the means by which it is created (the
AGENTIVE quale – here, an event of implementing) ; and its function or
purpose (the TELIC quale – here, an event of modeling whatever the
implementation is an implementation of). In addition, we might add an
INDEX feature as is used in the Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar
framework (HSPG) to indicate the type of discourse referent the noun
introduces, which could be either a kind or an individual, depending on the
context of use (Pustejovksy’s “dot” notation indicating the existence of
alternatives) 6.
(9) implementation
ARGSTR Arg0 x
Arg-of y
Arg-by z
INDEX x º k
QUALIA FORMAL implementation (k) ∧ R (x,k)
AGENTIVE implement (z,x,y,e)
TELIC model (x,y,e′)
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Representations such as that in (9) have been criticized for putting too much
world knowledge into semantics : it doesn’t seem plausible to maintain that
the way in which some artifact is created or its purpose should be lexically
encoded. Is it really the case, for example, that the lexical entry for pen should
specify that pens are for writing? Can they not be used for other purposes, e.g.
for pointing or stabbing? In an effort to deal with this problem, Saint-Dizier
(2001) suggests an intermediate approach : associating the TELIC feature
with an underspecified list of situations or events and the entailment that x has
the ability to be used in or to participate in these situations or events. An
argument in favor of this intermediate approach, and against abandoning
qualia such as TELIC altogether, comes from consideration of the other
examples of modification we have considered in this section, examples which
do not, strictly speaking, involve vagueness resolution in a descriptive sense,
and where pragmatics doesn’t appear to play a significant role, but which are
nonetheless amenable to an analogous kind of treatment.
Consider the interpretation of occasional smoker. Although Larson’s
analysis presupposes assigning nouns an event argument, some semanticists
have argued that certain classes of stative predicates, including those
systematically denoted by nouns, should not be assigned such an argument in
the same way that nonstative predicates are (see e.g. Kratzer, 1995 ; Katz,
2003).7Adopting a version of the representation in (9) offers the possibility of
capturing Larson’s intuition that occasional denotes a property of events
while not forcing us to encode that event variable in the noun argument
structure list, given that the variables encoded in the ARGSTR feature can be
a proper subset of those which appear in the semantics. For example, the
representation for smoker could be as in (10), where for the sake of
illustration I use the AGENTIVE quale to represent the intuition that one
becomes a smoker via participation in smoking events, and I have not
provided a value for the TELIC quale, given that smokers are not
conventionally associated with any particular purpose or function.
(10) smoker
ARGSTR Arg0 x
Arg-of y
INDEX x º k
QUALIA FORMAL smoker (k) ∧ R (x,k)
AGENTIVE smoke (x,y,e)
The adjective occasional could then modify the event argument in the value
for the AGENTIVE quale, via Pustejovky’s Selective Binding composition
rule 8, which allows an adjective to restrict the value of a variable in one of a
noun’s qualia, instead of restricting the variable that corresponds to the entity
denoted by the noun. In an entirely parallel fashion, Selective Binding could
196 LOUISEMCNALLY
also permit a relational adjective to modify the kind variable in the value of
the FORMAL quale. The representations in (9)-(10) thus allow for the use of
a single compositional strategy to account for a wider variety of data than
those initially considered by Pustejovsky, including data which do not appear
susceptible to the criticism that highly structured representations are letting
too much nonlinguistic information into the lexicon.
A different kind of objection to representations such as (9) and (10)
might be that such highly articulated structures are unnecessary, and that
knowing the lexical entailments of the adjective and the noun is sufficient for
determining the available interpretations of the adjective under modification.
However, rather than concluding that such structures are unnecessary, it
seems more productive to view them as a tool precisely for organizing lexical
entailments, grouping together or giving prominence to those entailments
which play the most important roles in phenomena such as vagueness
resolution.
One consequence of this structuring of lexical entailments, and one
that constitutes yet another consideration in favor of embracing a feature
structure representation for lexical semantics, is methodological in nature : the
adoption of novel representations or formalisms can lead one to ask questions
which might otherwise not have been asked, and to discover generalizations
which might otherwise have not been uncovered. The analysis of vagueness
resolution involving the adverb well in McNally & Kennedy (to appear) is a
case in point. When modifying participles, well often can have either a degree
or a manner interpretation, as in (11).9
(11) a. well-cooked meat
b. a well-prepared speaker
McNally and Kennedy argue that well is unambiguous, and that the manner
reading arises when the adverb modifies an event variable in the value of the
AGENTIVE quale, while the degree reading arises when it modifies an event
variable in the TELIC quale – in other words, the behavior of well reproduces
in the adverbial domain a kind of vagueness resolution first identified in the
adjectival domain, an interesting parallelism which had not been previously
identified but which is fully expected if participles have a lexical semantic
representation similar to that of nouns.
I now turn to the second kind of modification problem, which offers a
different kind of support for the use of highly structured lexical
representations.
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3. The scalar dimension of adjective and noun semantics
One of the ways in which gradable adjectives can be vague involves
the scale with respect to which the properties they denote are evaluated.
Kennedy & McNally (2005) present a typology of the scale structures
adjectives can be associated with. In this section, I will offer some examples
of how the scale structure with respect to which an adjective is interpreted can
be influenced by the noun the adjective modifies. As we will see, the facts to
be accounted for are complex enough to make structured representations very
useful.
One of the basic parameters of scale structure in Kennedy &
McNally’s typology involves whether the scale (which can be understood for
present purposes as a totally ordered set of points) is bounded (i.e. has
endpoints) or unbounded (lacks endpoints). The bounded or unbounded
nature of an adjective’s scale is identifiable among other ways via the choice
of degree modifier expressions that are felicitous with that adjective in a given
context. For example, adjectives such as partially are felicitous only when the
adjective they modify is interpreted with respect to a bounded scale. Thus, the
contrast between the examples in (12) – in which the degree modifier is in one
case felicitous and in the other infelicitous with the same adjective (at least in
the absence of further context, about which see below) – shows that the
(un)boundedness of the scale is at least sometimes a fact about the
accompanying noun.
(12) a. ??partially blue liquid
b. a partially blue screen
A comparison of the entities denoted by liquid vs screen, along with the
interpretations of the acceptable phrases, immediately clarifies the role of the
noun in determining scale structure. A partially blue screen is one part of
which is blue ; there is no implication, for example, that the color of the screen
is a shade which is something less than true blue (e.g. powder blue). The
unavailability of this reading with liquid is arguably due to the fact that liquid
lacks discrete proper parts which can be different colors. That is, the structure
(and in particular the bounds) of the scale that licenses the use of the adverb
partially is homomorphically related to the structure of the object denoted by
the noun.
However, it is important to observe that the part structure of the
denotation of a noun and its homomorphic relation to scale structure is
independent of whether the noun is count or mass, and is instead a fact about
the noun’s fine-grained semantics. Consider the examples in (13).
(13) a. ??a partially blue beverage
b. partially blue sand
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The noun beverage, though count, denotes a substance similar to that denoted
by liquid insofar as it lacks a discrete internal part structure. Sand, in contrast,
though mass, denotes a substance which does have a discrete internal part
structure (the individual grains).
Clearly, these examples show that calculating the interpretation of
degree modifier-adjective-noun constructions requires not only keeping track
of the scalar properties of the adjective but also relating those properties to the
semantics of the noun. McNally & Kennedy (to appear) propose that a very
convenient way to do this is to provide adjectives with a Scale Structure
(SCSTR), analogous to GL’s Argument Structure, Event Structure (left out of
the discussion here for the sake of simplicity) and Qualia Structure, where
information which is relevant to determining scalar semantics can be encoded,
and which can be inherited by successively larger phrases containing the
adjective and noun. In order for a given degree modifier to be licensed, the
conditions on scale structure that it imposes have to be satisfied by expression
that it combines with. For example, the adjective bluemight be represented as
in (14), where the adjective has a scale structure feature which indicates the
type of scale (SCTYPE), including the dimension the scale measures and
whether it is bounded or not. In addition, the scale structure feature contains
another feature which encodes the standard value (STD), which is a context
dependent degree variable d.
(14) blue
ARGSTR Arg0 x
INDEX x
SCSTR SCTYPE DIMENSION blueness
BOUNDED
STD d
QUALIA FORMAL blue(x)
As a first approximation, I will assume that an object can have color in either
(or both) of two gradable dimensions : in what I will call “trueness” (cp. pale
blue, very blue, dark blue), or else in extension.10 In the absence of additional
context, it is underdetermined which of these two more specific scales the
adjective is associated with. The value of the DIMENSION feature blueness
should be understood as a supertype of these two more specific dimensions,
susceptible to further specification as BLUENESS_TRUENESS or
BLUENESS_EXTENSION. The scale corresponding to trueness does not appear to
be bounded in nature – the expression partially blue does not refer to the
trueness of the color but rather only to its extension over some entity.11 In
contrast, as we have seen in (12) and (13), the scale corresponding to
extension can at least in principle be bounded, though whether it is bounded
or not in fact appears to depend on the part structure of the entity being
described.
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Let us assume that the degree modifier partially combines with the
adjective to form an adjective phrase that will then modify a noun. The lexical
entry for partially will specify that the output of combining the degree
modifier with any adjective will have to be interpreted with respect to a closed
scale. The phrase partially blue could thus be represented as in (15). The scale
has been fixed as bounded (marked via a positive value on the Boolean feature
BOUNDED), which means that the DIMENSION of the scale must be fixed as
blueness_extension. The standard for being partially blue will be the minimal
endpoint on the bounded blueness_extension scale, as shown in (15).
(15) partially blue
ARGSTR Arg0 x
INDEX x
SCSTR SCTYPE DIMENSION blueness_extension
BOUNDED +
STD dMIN-blueness
QUALIA FORMAL blue(x)
Now let us consider what happens when this adjective phrase combines with
a noun. As noted above, the adjective blue seems to be sensitive to the
discreteness of the part structure of the object to which it is ascribed. This is
exactly the kind of information the CONSTITUTIVE quale is designed to
encode. As both screens and sand necessarily have identifiably discrete
(proper) parts, I propose encoding this information under the
CONSTITUTIVE feature as in (16) 12 :
(16) QUALIA FORMAL screen/sand(z)
CONST ∃w[w < z ∧∀w´[w´ < z → discrete(w´)]]
In contrast, liquid and beverages, though they clearly can have parts, at least
in most normal circumstances do not have identifiably discrete parts. Only
under the right circumstances can their parts be discrete, for example if we
imagine a beverage which consists of several ingredients of different weights
which precipitate into different layers 13, or if we partition a given quantity of
liquid into different containers. Thus, rather than encoding in the
CONSTITUTIVE quale that the denotations of these nouns do not have
discrete parts, I propose simply leaving this information unspecified.
In order to complete our analysis we now need only specify via a
constraint the way the adjective phrase partially blue is sensitive to the part
structure of the noun it modifies. One last step before doing this involves
asking whether all bounded scale adjective phrases are sensitive to the
discreteness of the parts of the object they describe, or whether only certain
such adjectives are. Intuitively, what makes partially blue sensitive to this
property is the fact that it applies to an object in virtue of necessarily applying
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to one or more of its proper parts, with the implication (if not entailment) that
it does not apply to all of its parts ; if the parts are not discrete, it will be
difficult to distinguish the parts which are blue from those which are not.
However, not all adjective phrases are like this : for example, some can
apply holistically to an object in different degrees, such as awake (if I am
partially awake, it is not entailed that part of me is awake while another part
is not, but rather that I as a whole have not reached a state of total
consciousness). Thus, we should impose the condition that an adjective
phrase select only for nouns describing entities with discrete parts just in the
case of adjectives that hold of an object in virtue of holding of one or more of
its proper parts. A preliminary version of such a constraint appears in (17),
where the restriction to bounded-scale adjectives that apply to wholes in
virtue of applying to parts is represented in the FORMAL quale (α is a
variable over predicate names), and the requirement on the noun is encoded
as a selectional restriction (here, the path to the semantics for the selected
noun – though not the semantics itself – is based on the HPSG analysis of
adjectival modification, see e.g. Pollard and Sag, 1994).
(17) CAT |… | MOD-ADJ |…| CONST ∃w [w < x ∧ ∀w´[w´ < x → discrete (w´)]] 
SCSTR | SCTYPE | BOUNDED +
QUALIA | FORMAL [α(x) ∧ ∃y[y < x → α(y)]]
Note that, given the way phrases are composed in unification-based
frameworks such as HPSG, this constraint will not preclude the adjectival
phrase partially blue from combining with a noun that lacks the discrete-parts
entailment, but rather will only prevent it from combining with a noun which
specifies the negation of this entailment. Thus, in principle, we should be able
to construct interpretations for phrases such as partially blue liquid.14
However, in the absence of context that provides a plausible referent for this
phrase, it will sound infelicitous.
Without the level of semantic detail discussed in this section, not only
is it not clear how we would account for the interpretations of blue ; I think it
is worth observing that the type of information being exploited to account for
the facts (namely, information about the part structure of the noun) is also
going to be of use in accounting for other semantic phenomena, such as the
distribution of nouns that refer to portions of matter, such as grain, particle,
slice, etc. 15.
Although the details discussed here could be described without the use
of the feature structure representations, such structures offer at least two
advantages. First, they are a very convenient tool for representing those
aspects of meaning which interact with or depend on the morphosyntactic
context. Second, in an ideal world, precisely those entailments that best match
the sort of features that lie behind Pustejovsky’s qualia should be those that
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natural languages make most use of, and therefore should be the best
candidates for putting into lexical representations – in this sense, Generative
Lexicon theory really does constitute a testable theory of which aspects of
semantics are prioritized in language. Whether this ideal will turn out to be a
reality or not is a question for future research.
4. Conclusion
The time is long overdue for formal semanticists to take seriously the
fine details of the interaction of lexical and compositional semantics, such as
the modification problems discussed in this paper. Moving to a richer
representation language may not be absolutely essential, but it has two
methodological advantages. First, it will likely lead us to investigate
important empirical domains we previously ignored. And second, it can serve
as a framework for testing and developing a theoretically interesting means of
organizing lexical entailments, a first step in coping with the difficult and
diffuse boundary between the lexicon and encyclopedic knowledge.
NOTES
1. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers and Denis Bouchard for comments
on an earlier draft. This work has been supported by a grant from the Generalitat de
Catalunya.
2. The reader is referred to McNally & Boleda (2004) for further details ; see also
Fradin & Kerleroux (2003) for a different proposal which is fundamentally similar in
spirit.
3. Though Davidson posited an event argument only for nonstative verbs,
subsequent authors such Parsons (1990) extend this proposal to all verbs.
4. Familiarity with GL is not crucial for the present discussion, and therefore in
the interest of space I will not present an introduction to it here. The reader is referred
to Pustejovsky (1995) for details ; some additional information will also be provided
below.
5. Throughout the paper, only directly relevant qualia features will appear in any
given semantic representation. Note also that nothing in GL requires all expressions to
have values for all qualia features.
6. This and other representations used in this paper revise or extend in some
respects, and simplify in others, what is proposed in Pustejovsky (1995). Pustejovsky
is not very specific about how argument structure is related to syntax ; in McNally &
Kennedy (to appear) we propose treating argument structure as in HPSG, where it is a
CATEGORY feature – closer to syntax than semantics. Information about whether
argument realization is obligatory or optional is handled via a distinct VALENCE
(subcategorization) feature. See e.g. Pollard & Sag (1994) for additional details.
7. An anonymous reviewer also points out that assigning all nouns an event
argument incorrectly predicts that sentences such as (i) should be ambiguous :
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(i) This is a beautiful house.
The fact that not all nouns modified by beautiful give rise to the sort of ambiguity
found in (1a) could perhaps be explained by positing that different types of nouns
denote relations between individuals and different types of events, some of which
would perhaps not admit modification by beautiful. Nonetheless, such an explanation
raises an important further question about Larson’s analysis : what determines the type
of event that appears in a noun’s semantics? For example, should dancer’s event
argument correspond to an event of dancing, as Larson’s analysis would seem to
suggest, or to the state of being a dancer? These questions point to a perhaps not
entirely visible complexity underlying Larson’s proposal which I think Generative
Lexicon-type representations help bring to light.
8. See Saint-Dizier (2001 : 177) for a formulation of Selective Binding which
improves somewhat on Pustejovsky’s (1995) formulation.
9. Both readings are not always available ; in particular, the degree reading is
blocked in a systematic set of cases (such as a well-written novel) because of the way
in which well’s semantics interacts with the contents of the TELIC quale. See McNally
& Kennedy (to appear) for further details concerning these conditions.
10. It might seem like a simplification to try to linearize a color scale of this kind,
as colors are determined by a combination of characteristics such hue and saturation.
Nonetheless, the fact that it is possible to compare the colors of objects (e.g. His shirt
is bluer than mine) indicates that we do impose the same kind of partial order on
objects according to their color as we do according to other properties. Perhaps what
distinguishes colors from certain other properties is the complexity of the mapping
from the different shades of a given color to the partial order that makes for a linear
color scale based on what I have called “trueness” : for example, it might turn out that
a given instance of light blue will be judged as bluer than a given instance of dark blue,
or vice versa, depending on the amount of white, black and gray that is mixed in with
the colors.
11. That is, my intuition is that speakers do not use partially blue when they are
talking about e.g. blue-green, though they might use similar expressions such as
somewhat blue.
12. The condition that the entity denoted by the noun have proper parts is stated
very weakly here ; if we assume that the domain of individuals has an algebraic
structure (see e.g. Link, 1983), we could no doubt be much more specific, encoding,
among other things, additional information such as whether the noun has the
cumulative reference property or not (see Krifka, 1989).
13. An anonymous reviewer suggests a latte macchiato as an example.
14. Such examples can be constructed in contexts where we can imagine the
liquid’s color changing over time or, as noted above in relation to beverages, where we
the liquid contains colored substances which precipitate into different layers.
15. In fact, quite detailed information about the (non) discrete parts of objects will
be necessary to distinguish e.g. parts of sand, which can be called grains or particles,
among other things, from parts of dust, which can be called particles but not grains,
perhaps because they are not hard enough.
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RÉSUMÉ
En sémantique formelle, l’information encodée dans les représentations
lexicales et les règles de composition est traditionnellement relativement
limitée ; dans ce type d’approche, le contexte joue un rôle considérable dans
l’interprétation. Ce type d’approche est justifié si l’on cherche à rendre compte
seulement des implications strictes des énoncés. Cependant, une telle
répartition des tâches implique une simplification des représentations
lexicales, relégant un nombre important de problèmes à la «poubelle
pragmatique». Dans cet article, je discute deux types de problèmes liés à la
modification du GN qui montrent que des représentations lexicales plus
riches, comparables à celles proposées par la théorie du Lexique Génératif
(Pustejovsky, 1995), devraient être prises en compte en sémantique formelle.
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Sémantique, lexique, modification, groupe nominal, Lexique Génératif.

